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Trade Union Trade-Offs: Unions, Voters, 
and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism
Kim Gabbitas
The University of Utah
Abstract
Trade union membership in European Union member states has been in decline for 
decades, which has many concerned about the future of workers’ rights. While existing 
work examines the reasons for this decline, my research shifts the focus from union density 
to the functions unions serve and how these functions affect and are affected by changing 
electoral behavior. I examine the rise of right-wing populist movements in Europe and how 
these movements and the challenges today’s labor unions face can be traced to the same un-
derlying forces. I argue that, as the relevance of trade unions declines for blue-collar work-
ers, support for right-wing movements increases. I test this claim with the help of statistical 
analyses of European Values Study data. I find preliminary support for my hypothesis, and 
suggest how this can inform our responses to the rise of populism in Europe.
Keywords
 trade unions, labor, industrial relations, elections
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In recent years, the rise of radical right-wing populist movements throughout the 
European Union has been observed by a wide variety of social scientists and journalists. 
While this rise has been significant since the 1990s in some areas, the success of the Leave 
campaign in the United Kingdom (UK) and the election of Donald Trump in the United 
States (US) have brought these movements into the forefront of the greater political dia-
logue. A variety of explanations have been fielded for the increasing popularity of these 
movements, but none adequately explain the electoral behavior of the working class. In 
this paper, I present an alternative explanation: as trade unions increasingly fail to engage 
a changing working class, low-wage and blue collar workers turn to populist movements 
touting anti-establishment and anti-globalization rhetoric. 
I examine the relationship between the declining strength of labor unions and the 
rise of radical right-wing populist movements, and use that analysis to understand how the 
same underlying forces cause both. I then present suggestions for how the European Union 
can use this understanding to inform the responses to illiberal, Eurosceptic movements 
while simultaneously addressing the legitimate concerns of the working class.
The Rise of Populism
Founded in 1972, the French National Front party was nothing more than a fringe 
movement with virtually zero electoral success for the first decade of its existence. Under 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, however, these right-wing radicals gained 9.6 percent of the vote in 
1988 and more than 14 percent in French presidential elections. Similarly, the Swedish 
radical right-wing Autopartei (literally “Automobile Party”) went from two seats in parlia-
ment to 10 in just four years between 1987 and 1991. Similar radical right populist parties 
like Vlaams Blok and Ny Demokrati emerged from virtual unrecognition to relative elec-
toral success across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Betz, 1994). While populist movements 
vary greatly by geography, they usually share common ultra-nationalist, Eurosceptic, and 
anti-globalization themes. Jens Rydgren (2005) theorizes that extreme right-wing popu-
list parties are part of a family of ideologies, supported by and learning from one another. 
However, these radical right-wing parties often don’t match traditional right-wing beliefs 
in every way.
Consider the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). M5S is one of the most distinc-
tive populist movements currently facing Europe because it strives to remain above either 
the right or the left, instead seeking an anti-party agenda. While many movements have 
found a wider audience for their ideas through the internet, M5S considers it its genesis. 
For M5S, the internet is “a medium remorselessly eliminating mediation of all kinds that 
will eventually destroy parties and make possible a form of direct democracy if the people 
control the government through constant voting over the web (The Economist, 2016).” 
Some have called this strategy unrealistic, even Messianic in its idealism, but M5S can give 
us great guidance in understanding how these populist movements grow into disruptive 
electoral factions. By repeatedly telling the story of hyper-partisanship ruining the function 
of government and the establishment using these functions to their own gain, an aggres-
sively anti-system rhetoric can be largely void of tangible policy and still attract a high 
volume of voters.
In June of 2016, the United Kingdom shocked the world when a referendum to 
leave the European Union passed despite the advice of former prime ministers, business 
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and financial leaders, and despite polls predicting the opposite. Markets, media, and even 
pro-Brexit voters were shocked by the move, the first major populist upset of the year. The 
primary question of the aftermath was how this movement, which had been dismissed as 
far-fetched and foolish in the 1990s, gained so much support so quickly. The Financial Times 
suggests four ingredients which caused the change: dissatisfaction with the elite, the ubiq-
uitous urban/rural divide, immigration conflicts, and a perceived loss of control. The Vote 
Leave campaign harnessed voters with these concerns by peddling an anti-immigration 
message focused on the inability of the political elites, like former Prime Minister David 
Cameron, to lead change. By advertising Brexit as the move that would finally set the 
UK free from the elites and the bureaucracy, the Leave campaign came out the other side 
stronger, louder, and smarter than the Remain campaign. 
As Michael Broenig (2017) suggests, populist movements have gained strength 
in Europe partially due to the convergence of the mainstream center-left and center-right 
parties, which has left those outside the center without mainstream leaders or representa-
tion. Disenfranchised, often working class voters turn to the rising populist movements who 
promise a refuge from the mainstream ‘establishment’ or ‘elite.’ This also manifests in anti-
democratic sentiments, as noted by scholars such as Robert Foa and Yascha Mounk (2016) 
who examined a World Values Survey wave published in 2016 and found that support for 
authoritarian forms of government is on the rise, while support for democratic institutions is 
declining, especially among the younger generations. Social and electoral support for radical 
right-wing populist movements across the western world is on the rise. 
While it may be tempting to assume this trend will dwindle in favor of the tra-
ditional centrist parties and institutions that have defined the western world for the last 
century, there is a danger to this: the election of Donald Trump shows that even the most 
stable democracies can be susceptible to these anti-establishment movements. If we follow 
this trend to its logical end, there is a very real risk that the same liberal institutions we rely 
on for protection of human rights, basic environmental policy, and even conflict resolution 
will become obsolete to the detriment of people and societies worldwide. Trade, human 
migration, and international cooperation all risk major setbacks from which it could take 
decades to recover. 
The Decline of Trade Unions
Trade union membership has been on the decline across western countries for 
the last three decades, in many areas falling to record lows, as reported by the International 
Labour Organization (2015). Many have long assumed that labor unions are inevitably 
going to become extinct; unless trade unions substantially shift their focus towards new and 
emerging demographics within the labor force and reevaluate their relationships with gov-
ernment entities, they may indeed. Union leaders have oft conceded these challenges. As 
the president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL–CIO) said in 2013; “[O]ur still-struggling economy, weak laws and political as well 
as ideological assaults have taken a toll on union membership, and in the process, have also 
imperiled economic security and good, middle-class jobs” (Trumka, 2013).
European trade union leaders are responding with more optimism to the similar 
situation they face. Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, said:
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Today’s relatively small fall in the number of union members is actually a union 
success story, given the continuing decline in traditionally unionized jobs in sec-
tors such as manufacturing. Indeed, after falling strongly through the 1980s and 
early 1990s, union membership has roughly stabilized since 1997 … economic 
changes mean that unions have to run hard just to keep still. (Waddington, 2005)
Increased trade and rapid globalization has left the unskilled working class feeling 
victimized by lower wages and the uncertain futures of their jobs in manufacturing and 
industry, and the labor movement has failed to keep up with their changing concerns. 
Furthermore, trade unions have yet to design a successful method of organizing low-wage 
service workers, the still-growing largest sector of low-wage labor. Existing research focuses 
on three central explanations for this trend: macroeconomic conditions (sometimes called 
the ‘business cycle’ explanation), the changing composition of the labor force, and increas-
ing legislative barriers. To understand the relationship between the decline of trade unions 
and the rise of populism, I will consider each of these explanations briefly, leaving further 
debate regarding the reasons for continuing trade union decline to future research. 
Using macroeconomic trends to understand changes in union density is an overall 
rather successful approach. This model shows that, in the short run, union density is related 
positively to changes in employment and price inflation and negatively to unemployment 
and wage inflation. Furthermore, in the long run, union density is negatively related to 
real wage growth (Disney, 1990). Union membership is also closely tied to the number of 
employees in a business (measured as average firm size), such that union density is strongest 
with large firm sizes and low unemployment—signs of a strong economy—and weakest 
when unemployment is high and firm sizes are small. This model therefore suggests that we 
cannot expect to see union density increase substantially until real wages and employment 
are also increasing. 
The most popular and most widely accepted and cited explanation for the decline 
of labor unions is the changing composition of the labor force both from demanders and 
suppliers of labor. In virtually every developed country, we can observe the economic shift 
from manufacturing and industry to service economies and white-collar labor. For labor 
unions seeking new members, workers in a service economy (what we might traditionally 
call ‘white-collar’) can be prohibitively difficult to organize. Less homogenous preferences 
and the lack of a historically organized community among these workers are factors, as is 
the transient relationship between workers and employers, which is caused by the growing 
trend of flexibility and individualism in the workplace. Indeed, a paper from the European 
Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety claims: 
Employment is shifting from industry, where unionization rates tend to be 
relatively high, to private sector services, where unionization rates are lower. 
Associated with this shift are the growth of atypical forms of employment, 
employment at small workplaces and new forms of employment relationship. 
Trade union movements have yet to adjust to these developments with the con-
sequence that members are being lost from industry at a higher rate than they are 
being recruited in private sector services. (Schnabel, 2012)
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As workers become more likely to work short-term jobs and change jobs fre-
quently, workplace culture has shifted toward growing emphasis on the individual rela-
tionships between employees and employers, which draws workers away from the sense of 
community that is so important to union recruitment techniques. The lower unionization 
rates of this new workforce have contributed substantially to decreasing density.
Public opinion has changed as well, and unions are seen more and more negatively 
in the western world. In a collection of surveys conducted by Gallup in the United States, 
workers point to concerns about corruption and greed within labor unions. Overall, public 
opinion of labor unions has decreased significantly since its high point in 1955. Currently, 
only 56% of people in the US have a favorable view of labor unions (Gallup, 2016). The 
same polls also suggest that more people think labor unions are unnecessary thanks to the 
gains already made in labor rights. 
Structural changes in domestic industrial relations have made unions increasingly 
less relevant to the average worker. The difference in wages between unionized and non-
unionized workers has shrunk substantially, leading the costs of union membership to out-
weigh the benefits. Employment law has also increasingly favored the militantly anti-union 
stance of employers recently, and right-to-work laws, which have inhibited union access to 
the workplace, make it increasingly difficult to recruit new members. Using a simple linear 
regression analysis to explore the long-term effects of changes in legal regulations, Freeman 
and Pelletier (1990) find that more recent legislation has been a major driver of decline in 
union membership. These authors also find a major difference in membership in work-
places where unions are recognized versus those where unions have not gained recognition, 
showing that the attitudes of management toward trade unions is also a major determinant 
of the strength and density of unions (Freeman & Pelletier, 1990). 
Similarly, states that follow the Ghent system, in which unemployment insurance 
is distributed by trade unions, see significantly higher rates of union density as compared 
to non-Ghent states. But even where unions play a vital legal function, membership is still 
affected by the other variables discussed here. However, even these systems are eroding in 
favor of more centralized welfare systems (Böckerman, 2005).
Where Trade Unions and Populism Intersect
The rise of globalization has substantially changed the interest of the working class. 
Regions rich in capital continue to see significant decreases in jobs and slowing growth 
in the manufacturing and industry sectors due to the significantly cheaper labor markets 
elsewhere and the automation of many unskilled jobs. These displaced workers, in need 
of secure employment, must either enter further occupational training and education pro-
grams or must accept significantly lower wages and competition from migrant workers, 
automation, and off-shoring for their jobs. Thus, it is reasonable for the unskilled working 
class to move to the right, towards protectionist trade policy, anti-immigration stances, 
and a general distrust of democratic institutions, or ‘the establishment,’ which are benefit-
ing from the cheaper labor markets available outside of capital rich regions. Unfortunately 
for trade unions and other democratic institutions, their commitment to the liberal ideals 
attractive to skilled workers, skilled laborers, or working professionals are no longer attrac-
tive to the unskilled, low-wage sectors of the working class. 
As labor unions increasingly represent these groups who aren’t as threatened by 
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factors like globalization and immigration—groups which may in fact benefit from them in 
the long run—they are accordingly maintaining left-leaning policies. Unions throughout 
North America and Europe have released statements on the importance of assisting refu-
gees in workplace integration and on the benefits of globalization and increased trade. As 
trade union density decreases over time and membership shifts toward professionals and 
skilled workers, the low-wage earning working class, which is more likely to perceive a 
threat from increased trade and immigration, does not have the traditional advocate they 
had during the early decades of the labor movement. They therefore seek representation 
in emerging populist movements which tout antiestablishment, ultranationalist ideals. The 
rise of radical right populist movements in North America and Europe provides an oppor-
tunity for massive swaths of the working class who feel their interests are not represented 
by trade unions to find leaders who propose increasing barriers to human migration, heavily 
penalizing outsourcing of jobs and businesses through high tariffs, and a return to domestic 
manufacturing and industry as solutions to the specter of a highly-educated workforce and 
service based economy. What emerges is a struggle between the liberal trade unions and the 
radical right wing populists for control of the working class voting bloc.
If this trend can be demonstrated, it means there is a clear shortfall in our current 
institutions: the ideals of liberal democracy do not fully represent a working class which is 
becoming less and less satisfied with the organizations meant to guarantee their interests.
Research Design
 To test my theory, I analyze the relationships between public opinion related to 
labor unions and political parties, including union membership and other variables. I restrict 
my analysis to data from the European Values Study, because it is sufficiently uniform and 
reliable. The European Values Study (hereafter called “EVS”) data comes from waves 1 
thru 4, between 1981 and 2008. These results include nearly 165,000 unique  observations 
in 48 countries1. Questions are translated and altered for best fit in each geographic region 
(e.g. confidence in the European Union is not measured in the United States), and all waves 
use a universe which includes the adult population of a country, ages 18 and older2. This 
survey used representative multi-stage or stratified random sampling throughout and was 
conducted through face-to-face interviews. The relevant survey questions are: whether the 
respondent belongs to a trade union, the level of confidence in trade unions, and where the 
respondent places her- or himself on the political scale from left to right, with 1 being the 
furthest left and 10 being the furthest right (see Table 1). I use IBM’s SPSS Statistics 24 for 
my analysis. 
1  Albania (AL); Armenia (AM); Austria (AT); Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA); Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Be-
larus (BY); Canada (CA); Switzerland (CH); Cyprus (CY); Cyprus (CY), Turkish Cypriot Community ; Czech 
Republic (CZ); Germany (DE); Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE); Spain (ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); Great Britain 
(GB-GBN); Northern Ireland (GB-NIR); Georgia (GE); Greece (GR); Croatia (HR); Hungary (HU); Ireland 
(IE); Iceland (IS); Italy (IT); Lithuania (LT); Luxembourg (LU); Latvia (LV); Moldova, Republic of (MD); Monte-
negro (ME); Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of (MK); Malta (MT); Netherlands (NL); Norway (NO); 
Poland (PL); Portugal (PT); Romania (RO); Serbia (RS); Kosovo-Metohija (RS-KM); Russian Federation (RU); 
Sweden (SE); Slovenia (SI); Slovakia (SK); Turkey (TR); Ukraine (UA); United States (US).
2  Excludes Wave 4, in which observations from Finland include adults ages 18 thru 74, and observations from 
Armenia include those 15 years and older.
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Table 1
EVS Longitudinal Data File 
1981-2008
EVS1981 EVS1990 EVS1999 EVS2008
S Archive/ID Variables and Interview Characteristics
a067 Member: 
Belong 
to labour 
unions
v121 q134a v15 v13
e033 Self posi-
tioning in 
political 
scale
v458 q478 v185 v193
e069_05 Confidence: 
Labour 
Unions
v543 q550f v204 v209
EVS Variable Descriptions with Variable Codes. Adapted from “EVS 1981-2008 Variable 
Report Longitudinal Data Files.” European Values Study and GESIS Data Archive for the 
Social Sciences; 2015.
If the null hypothesis is correct, there will be no difference between union mem-
bers and non-union members. To display the difference which I believe exists, I create 
contingency tables for each EVS wave using variables a067 and e033, and variables e069_05 
and e033. If my hypothesis is correct, I should find that union members are increasingly 
more likely to place themselves on the right side of the political scale over time, though 
they should still be much less likely than non-union members to identify with the far 
right. Analysis should also show that those with high confidence in labor unions (variable 
e069_05) are more likely to position themselves to the left of the political spectrum, while 
those with low confidence are more likely to position themselves to the right. These dif-
ferences should remain constant over time; however, the full sample should show a shift 
to the right. 
To further test the relationships between these variables, I attempt an ordinal regres-
sion analysis. I use the same variables from the EVS Longitudinal dataset, but recode the data 
to be conducive to an ordinal regression analysis by creating a series of dummy variables 
for each of the two independent variables, such that: confidence_1 is E069_05=Missing, 
Unknown; confidence_2 is E069_05=No answer; confidence_3 is E069_05=Don´t know; 
confidence_4 is E069_05=A great deal; confidence_5 is E069_05=Quite a lot; confi-
dence_6 is E069_05=Not very much; confidence_7 is E069_05=None at all; and so forth, 
using the same logic for the membership variable. 
Trade Union Trade-Offs
8 2 Kim Gabbitas The University of Utah
Findings and Analysis
 My analysis of data gathered by the European Values Study between 1981 and 
2008 shows preliminary support for my theory. A comparison of contingency tables from 
each EVS wave between 1981 and 2008 showed that union members were less likely than 
non-union members to place themselves on the right end of the political spectrum until 
2008 (see Table 2). However, the proportion of union members who placed themselves 
on the right end of the political spectrum increased much more quickly than that of non-
union members. Indeed, the number nearly doubled between the third and fourth waves 
(see Figure 1).
Table 2
Wave Membership: yes Membership: no Sample
EVS1981 6.33% 8.93% 8.39%
EVS1990 5.31% 7.67% 7.15%
EVS1999 5.45% 8.14% 7.68%
EVS2008 10.47% 8.22% 8.4%
Far-Right Identity Over Time. Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents who position 
themselves 9-10 on the political scale from left to right, with 1 being the furthest left and 
10 being the furthest right. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values Study Longitudinal 
Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file 
Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253.
Figure 1. Right-Wing Identity Among Union Members. Figure 1 is the graphical repre-
sentation of the data displayed in Table 2. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values 
Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. 
ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253
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These data suggest that labor union members are increasingly identifying with the 
far right of the political spectrum, contrary to historical norms. Furthermore, the spike in 
union members placing themselves at 9 or 10 on the spectrum between 1999 and 2008 
may be indicative of the growing popularity of right-wing populist movements. Analysis 
of EVS2017, which will begin in August of 2017, may provide additional evidence of this 
trend. Additional research into the rates of membership decline and the rates of increasing 
right-wing identity could also help better describe these changes.
Analysis of respondents stratified by their level of confidence in labor unions shows 
that those with high confidence are more likely to position themselves to the left on the 
political spectrum (1 or 2), while those with low confidence are more likely to position 
themselves to the right (9 or 10). These differences remain constant over time and display 
a measurable shift toward the far-left and -right ends of the spectrum, supporting the idea 
that voters overall are more likely to identify with radical political movements than with 
the moderate or centrist ruling parties.
Figure 2. Left-Wing Identity by Union Confidence. Displays changes in the pro-
portion of respondents who identify as a 1 or 2 on the political spectrum, strati-
fied by level of confidence in labor unions. Adapted from EVS (2015): European 
Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS 
Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.1225
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Figure 3. Right-Wing Identity by Union Confidence. Displays changes in the proportion of 
respondents who identify as a 9 or 10 on the political spectrum, stratified by level of con-
fidence in labor unions. Adapted from EVS (2015): European Values Study Longitudinal 
Data File 1981-2008 (EVS 1981-2008). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4804 Data file 
Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253
 
As displayed in Figure 2, those with very high confidence in labor unions are the 
most likely to identify as either a 1 or 2, or far-left, on the political spectrum. Likewise, 
those with extremely low confidence are the most likely to identify as either a 9 or 10, or 
the far-right (see Figure 3). This finding suggests that as confidence in labor unions declines 
over time, total right-wing identity increases over time, supporting the theory that indi-
viduals losing confidence in labor unions may instead be placing that confidence in right-
wing populist movements. 
Based on the figures displayed above and the parameter estimates observed in 
Table 3a, we can assume there is a relationship between both membership in a labor union 
and level of confidence in labor unions and political identity. Using a logistic regression 
means we are testing the probabilities associated with observing certain responses. Thus, our 
model is: 
where the coefficients in our regression output tell us how much the logit, or probability of 
a specific value in the dependent variable, changes based on the values of our independent 
variables. The sign of the coefficient tells us if each independent variable correlates with a 
higher or lower dependent variable value. 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2017/iss1/8
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Table 3a
 PLUM Ordinal Regression
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Observing Table 3b below, we can reject the null hypothesis that a model without 
our independent variables is as good as a model with the independent variables. However, 
this doesn’t mean we can assume the model is a perfect fit. Observing Table 3c, we can see 
that the chi-square values are exceptionally large and our significance remains at the .000 
output. This suggests that our model does not fit the data in question. A model that fits 
properly should show a small chi-square value and a high significance level.
Table 3b
Model Fitting Information
Model
-2 Log 
Likelihood
Chi-
Square df Sig.
Intercept 
Only
3881.866
Final 1497.418 2384.448 8 .000
 Model Fitting Information
Link function: Logit.
Table 3c
Goodness-of-Fit
Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 917.509 55 .000
Deviance 917.231 55 .000
 Goodness-of-Fit Output
Link function: Logit.
While there are certain transformations of data and variations of models that could 
provide a better fit for our data, outlined below, the output we can observe suggests that 
decreasing confidence in labor unions increases the probability of selecting a higher value 
on the political identity scale. In other words, the lower one’s confidence in labor unions, 
the more likely one is to identify with right-wing political ideologies. Furthermore, having 
“a great deal” of confidence in labor unions (confidence_4) indicates a higher likelihood of 
placing oneself on the left-wing of the political spectrum. Not belonging to a labor union 
also increases the likelihood of a respondent selecting a higher value, or further right posi-
tion, on the political spectrum. 
Limitations
 While the data show some support for my hypothesis, there are significant cave-
ats to be considered in our data. First, the analysis does not control for use of the Ghent 
system. Combining union density statistics in both Ghent and non-Ghent states means our 
membership numbers are not fully reliable or consistent, and we instead see two distinct 
sets of membership rates: one with membership in the 80% range (Ghent states), and one 
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with membership clustered around 13%. Moving the analysis from the full dataset to a 
much smaller scale, such as a state-level analysis, would help us to gain a better idea of how 
different industrial relationships affect our hypothesis and would better control for the varia-
tions in the roles of labor unions, the unique flavors of each nationalist or radical right-wing 
movement, and differing population size, resources, economies, etc. 
 We must also consider the model fit. Recall that the output shown in Table 3c 
suggested a straightforward ordinal regression was not the best fit model. To correct this, 
future research should attempt a multivariate analysis to control for time. The dataset used 
here is longitudinal, covering four distinct EVS waves from 1981 to 2008. Using a general-
ized linear model with fixed effects could solve this problem and provide a much more reli-
able analysis of the relationships in question, including an analysis of these rates of change. 
The EVS 2017 wave will be introduced to the field in the fall of 2017, and will provide 
even more relevant information. Each of the trends I have observed has also increased its 
rate of change substantially in recent years, so adding the EVS2017 data to the mix will 
provide a greater range of data in which to observe these trends.
 Furthermore, if we are trying to show support for the hypothesis that these two 
trends share similar underlying causes, we should test those variables as well. The theoretical 
causes discussed in my literature review section are the convergence of mainstream politi-
cal movements, globalization manifested in increased trade and migration, and the growing 
distrust of the political and economic elite. To test the degree to which these causes may 
explain variation in both trends, we could run a similar analysis using variables which quan-
tify these changes. For example, using attitudes toward trade and immigration, we could 
create a “protectionist index” which could be used to determine if those holding more 
protectionist ideologies are more or less likely to distrust labor unions. We could use the 
same index to evaluate political identity. We could then assume that similar coefficients and 
significance suggests the hypothetical “protectionist index” is indeed a factor causing both 
trends and therefore the basis of the existing relationship for which we found evidence. We 
could also use such measurements as occurrence of foreign direct investments or multilateral 
trade agreements as measures of globalization. The same process could be followed using 
indexes representative of all three theoretical causes to better understand their roles in these 
trends. 
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, more research is needed to confirm my findings, but this preliminary 
analysis shows a worrying trend. As union density continues to fall, we can expect sup-
port for right-wing populist movements to grow. It is possible that falling confidence and 
membership can be reversed by increasing organization efforts among white collar work-
ers, advocating for greater interaction between government and labor unions, and allowing 
labor unions greater access to the workplace. By re-engaging the working class, and there-
fore providing them better political and social representation, labor unions can regain the 
strength of the labor movement in decades past and may be able to slow the rising distrust 
in democratic institutions that has closely followed radical right-wing populist movements. 
The economic concerns of blue collar workers are neither illegitimate nor inexorably tied 
to the rising intolerances characteristic of radical right-wing populist movements. Rather, 
it is the failure of liberal institutions like labor unions to adequately represent the economic 
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concerns of the working class that is continuing to encourage these shifts. Correcting these 
failures doesn’t necessitate a move to the right for labor unions. Instead, focusing on job 
placement for unemployed manufacturers and occupational education for those left behind 
by the shift to a service economy could bring this disenfranchised population back into the 
workforce. 
 The shared liberal values enshrined in democratic international regimes are essen-
tial to keeping peace and human security around the world; rising support for radical right 
wing populist parties across North America and Europe pose an unparalleled domestic 
threat to those regimes. But these trends are not inexorable. Trade unions and other liberal 
institutions can—and must—reconnect with and re-engage the working class and provide 
legitimate political and social representation.
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